Ditadura, Democracia e Desenvolvimento

Apenas para fundamentar o post abaixo, sobre a governança corporativa do crime, vai aí o abstract e o link de um dos mais interessantes artigos do Mancur Olson:

"Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by "roving bandits" destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator--a "stationary bandit" who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies will rarely have good economic performance for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth"

Cesarismo Democrático

É a tentação latino-americana da reeleição indefinida do glorioso líder, de acordo com o prof. Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, de Relações Internacionais da Universidad de Di Tella, Argentina:

"In 1919, the first edition of Democratic Caesarism , by the Venezuelan historian and sociologist Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, was published and widely circulated across the continent. Vallenilla claimed to be seeking an effective (as opposed to the formal) constitutional system for his country.

To achieve this end, Vallenilla argued that, at least in the case of Venezuela, a charismatic leader, confirmed in power through regular elections, would be best placed to concentrate political power successfully and guarantee institutional order. Ninety years later, it looks as though, with the rise of a variety of neo- caudillos , Vallenilla’s idea of the “good Caesar” is coming back."